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Abstract 
Who are people who make the decisions in trade and investment dispute settlement 
systems? In order to describe and analyze investment arbitrators and trade 
panelists, the whole populations of people nominated to ICSID’s tribunals and 
committees as well as to WTO Panels from 1995 to 2009 were studied, considering 
their specialization in law, and their career backgrounds as public servants, 
academics or private professionals. Applying Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of legal 
fields, the data suggested that both systems produce legitimacy but in quite 
different ways and, interestingly, that the one more similar to domestic legal 
systems takes that form due to political forces, not by an incremental process 
powered by people with legal backgrounds. 
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Introduction 
The main objective of this article is to compare data between people who were 
appointed as panelists in the dispute settlement system (DSS) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and as arbitrators and members of ad hoc committees of the 
International Center for Investment Dispute Settlement (ICSID) from 1995 to 
2009. This comparison aims to approach questions about how legitimacy is 
constructed by testing some hypotheses regarding the effects of institutionalized 
legal schemes of dispute resolution through the composition of the sets of judicial 
decision makers that operate each DSS. 
As a working definition, legitimacy is understood as the result of a political process 
of the consensual construction of the acceptance of authority. Further, legal 
legitimacy is here defined as a special type, which is obtained through a process 
performed by a specialized community generally recognized as having technical 
skills and knowledge to perform the impartial, if not neutral, application of a 
structured body of principles and rules legitimately discovered (natural law) or laid 
down (positive law), in order to settle private as well as public disputes. It is 
important to establish that legal legitimation technically presupposes the legitimacy 
of principles and rules, though in real social processes there are close interactions 
between judicial and legislative legitimacy. 
This definition of legal legitimacy does not match in all respects the mainstream 
definition, expressed by Max Weber as an ideal type featuring in modern societies 
and as the result of the activities of an impersonal, technically established 
bureaucracy, whose specialization ensures the correctness of governmental 
decisions, while the formalized and meritocratic procedures of gatekeeping assure 
neutrality (Weber 1968, 640).  
The definition in this paper is narrower in scope, since legal legitimacy covers only 
the judicial branch, which has important features that are not shared by all 
branches of government, though, of course, they also help to support the 
legitimacy of the state as a whole. Moreover, legitimation is not expected to be 
such a clear and clean result of the application of reason, but a social process 
backed by its ability to produce technical opacity and, consequently, the blind 
acceptance of a somewhat imposed order. In this sense, the concept employed 
hereby resembles the Niklas Luhmann’s theory of legitimation through procedure 
(Luhmann 1983, 260), which follows Weberian traditions, although enhancing the 
role of a purely procedural logic as sufficient to produce the acceptance of legal 
decisions, which replaces the idea (and the ideal) of a rationality backed by shared 
consensus on material aspects. However, as Jürgen Habermas stressed in his first 
Tanner Lecture (Habermas 1988), the procedural Weberian conception of rationality 
cannot be accepted as the real touchstone of legality and a far most complex social 
process of legitimation would be necessary to ensure both efficiency and fairness. 
Nevertheless, though somewhat linked to the Weberian heritage, the notion of 
legitimation process that is used in this paper refers to Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of the 
legal field as a social structure that performs a symbolic violence that dresses the 
crude use of force by state in the disguise of a fair decision system performed by 
specialists who are able to correctly understand the ultimate meanings of a legal 
corpus of rules laid down by democratic processes and controlled by academic and 
professional interpreters. Since rationality, fairness and neutrality are presupposed 
in Bourdieu’s perception of legitimacy, a main subject of study became the 
dynamics of processes, and the ways people construct the discourses through 
which symbolic violence is performed, as well as how they acquire and trade 
cultural capital in order to occupy central positions in the legal system. 
So Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of legal fields (Bourdieu 1986) is employed as an 
analytical tool that helps us to understand the international institutionalization of 
economic relations in issues as sensitive as trade and investment. Nevertheless, it 
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is necessary to stress that some aspects of the original theoretical design cannot be 
easily transferred to the processes of international legal legitimation. In fact, this 
theory originally dealt with the operation of domestic jurisdictional systems, which 
have a feature that is very weak in international environments: the centralization of 
power in, and the use of force by, the state is clear and does not need to be 
discussed. Therefore, the original theory of legal fields, though related to self-
regulatory concerns, does not need to deal with problems of institution building. 
Domestic legal fields are organized around state institutions and the struggles for 
power and prominence are related to the conquest of central positions, which are 
located close to the jurisdictional system and to legal academia, whose function is 
to provide an aura of independence and technicality. 
However, there are no presupposed legislative or adjudicative institutions in the 
international arena, and power is not concentrated in a single entity but scattered 
among several political actors. Therefore, elements of self-organization dealt with 
by the theory of fields must play an additional role in the analysis of international 
institutionalization: to help to explain socially cohesive structures capable of 
functioning as underpinnings to an incipient rearrangement of power, particularly 
its migration from state structures to international, interstate or transnational 
domains. In this context, the existence of a small and, most likely, cohesive group 
of arbitrators and panelists may be regarded as denoting the existence of a self-
sustaining network, which defines its own centres, while wider and less 
concentrated groups may be less dependent less on an elitist leadership, since the 
power of decisions derives from bureaucratic arrangements.  
In other words, it is possible to hypothesize that there is a structural relation 
between the degree of institutionalization and the features of fields that gravitate 
around such institutions. International legal systems that are linked to centralized 
strong DSSs may tend to be more similar to domestic legal systems and, 
consequently, may be operated by a set of functionally specialized actors who have 
no need to be leaders, but to perform their duties in the most neutral and 
technically correct fashions. On the other hand, loose DSSs have different features, 
and leaderships backed by a more general knowledge may substitute for the lower 
functional specialization. 
So, habitus and cultural capital are valued differently in more or less centralized 
structures. Consequently, it would be possible to hypothesize that leaders who form 
the habitus and have the social capital that fits a loose DSS have no interest in the 
constitution of a more institutionalized system in order to preserve their highly 
valued positions. If this is so, it would be unreasonable to expect that these actors 
would press for any kind of incremental change towards centralized institutions. 
A comparison of the development of international investment arbitration and the 
WTO’s DSS may help to clarify the ways the construction of international legal fields 
may reinforce institutionalization in very different ways. Following the path opened 
up by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (1996), international arbitration may be said 
to function as an escape from state regulation and, therefore, is mostly self-
organized through networks and identity links to which contribute some private 
organizations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. On 
the other hand, WTO’s DSS looks very much like a state adjudication system and 
the field may develop with close attention to admission rules, both formal and 
informal. 
So, to discuss the influence of the profiles of arbitrators and panelists on 
international institutionalization through the construction of legal fields, this paper 
puts forward an analysis of the professional profiles of all the arbitrators nominated 
to ICSID disputes, as well as all WTO DSS panelists, considering a limited set of 
variables, namely the overlap among people nominated to ICSID tribunals, WTO 
panels and the WTO Appellate Body (AB); their work in public, academic and/or 
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private sectors; the individual and general frequency of nominations; and their 
legal background. 
Following a brief account of the general features of ICSID and the WTO’s DSS, the 
paper will explain the categories and methods used to generate the data, which will 
then be analyzed, and then discussed in relation to the hypotheses sketched out in 
this Introduction. 
 
1. General features of ICSID and WTO’s DSS 
Though both DSSs are part of a discernible international legal system governing 
economic issues, they have several differences regarding their scope, structure and 
functioning, as well as their historical origins. It is, therefore, necessary to describe 
their main features as well as some remarks about their development, to facilitate 
the interpretation of the data on arbitrators and panelists. 
1.1. ICSID and investment arbitration 
International arbitration between investors and states was born as a substitute for 
the legal regimes of capitulations as well as the diplomatic protection of foreigners. 
The decolonization process that followed the Second World War took place in an 
international environment where the traditional European colonial powers lost much 
of their international power and became less able to impose capitulations. At the 
same time, the tensions of the Cold War left no space for diplomatic protection, 
since the support of foreign investors would be regarded as an undue and wrongful 
intervention against the newly independent countries and could galvanize public 
opinion in undesirable ways. Consequently, investors and their supporting states 
made efforts to build new political and legal devices to protect assets from 
nationalization and socialization, as discussed in the paper by Sornarajah in this 
collection. Some of them were devoted to creating legal sets of principles and rules 
to protect foreigners against allegedly politically unstable and legally 
underdeveloped countries, such as the development of a careful and complex 
contractual architecture that includes wide stabilization clauses; the promotion of 
national statutes to protect foreign investments, and the diffusion of foreign 
investment promotion and protection agreements (FIPPAs). These efforts to build 
normative underpinnings for foreign investment protection were complemented by 
the exclusion of domestic judicial forums as being inadequate to settle investment 
disputes, and the resort to denationalized arbitration between a private party – the 
investor – and a public one – the state or a public company.  
ICSID appeared in this climate, since, propelled by its General Counsel, Aron 
Broches, the World Bank championed the creation of this international institution to 
deal with such mixed arbitrations between investors and states, concretized in the 
Washington Convention of 1965. As an international scheme backed by a treaty, 
ICSID has some advantages over purely private institutions, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce of Paris (ICC) or the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC), since it (1) produces awards whose enforcement may be pursued 
in any member state, though respecting the local rules on immunities; (2) provides 
an international annulment scheme, which is unusual in arbitration; and (3) offer 
public facilities controlled by an international public organization, more transparent 
and immune from private control. 
FIPPAs, the most common legal basis for investment arbitrations, first appeared in 
the 1960s – the first one between Germany and Pakistan, in 1959. The concept of a 
FIPPA includes bilateral investment agreements (BITs), investment chapters in free 
trade agreements (FTAs), regional agreements, and agreements on specific 
industries. There is no multilateral FIPPA that covers all kinds of investment and the 
OECD’s attempt to promote the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) failed. 
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Moreover, though the Energy Charter Treaty is open to signature by any country, it 
only covers investments on energy and, as the effective list of members suggests, 
is de facto a regional treaty. Briefly, FIPPAs encompass (1) minimum standards of 
treatment (most favored nation, national treatment and fair and equitable 
treatment); (2) prohibition of expropriation unless for public purposes and 
accompanied by compensation; (3) the Hull formula of a prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation; (4) general provisions on transfers of capital, management 
and technical personnel, performance requirements, and full protection; as well as 
(5) consent to arbitration. 
The legal immunization from politics through the international institutionalization 
achieved by both FIPPAs and ICSID was accepted by host countries, whose 
governments need foreign investment to foster their development projects and 
could justify their subordination to international standards and principles rather 
than to the desires of a colonial power, and desired by home countries, which do 
not need to face public criticism directed against international policies designed to 
protect national capitalists. 
So, it can be said that the configuration of international law protecting foreign 
investments results from a complex historical substitution of capitulations regimes 
and diplomatic protection by a FIPPAs/arbitration system that combines private and 
public features, which is characterized by the convergence of a dense network of 
treaties, accelerating in the 1990s, and backed by international arbitration of 
disputes between states and foreign investors.  
However, the international system of protection of foreign investments based on 
FIPPAs and the ICSID was latent from the 1960s to the 1990s. The recourse to 
private arbitration and general principles of law marked this whole period until, 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall and, therewith, of Soviet imperial power over 
Central Europe, a widespread tsunami of investment agreements flooded both 
transition and developing countries, whose need to review and change growth and 
development policies was shown by the debt crisis of the 1980s.  
For instance, the South American countries, which said the “no of Tokyo” to ICSID 
in 1965, became members 30 years later: 8 of the 10 states that ratified the 
Washington Convention of 1965 did so after 1992 (COSTA, 2006)1. 
After that the caseload of ICSID grew steadily and reached more than 30 cases in 
2007 and seems to have stabilized at around 20 new claims yearly, as Graph 1 
shows: 
 
                                                 
1 Brazil and Suriname never signed nor became members of ICSID. 
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(From data in www.icsid.org, consulted June 10th, 2010) 
 
Almost all claims are by investors against states, and both consent to jurisdiction 
and the applicable law are based on FIPPAs. Moreover, the private arbitration of 
investment disputes using the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) rules and facilities are no longer the main 
way to deal with investor-state legal controversies. In fact, investment cases 
outside ICSID and UNCITRAL are less than 10% of the whole caseload2. 
Though it shares some features with commercial arbitration, as stressed by Yves 
Dezalay and Bryant Garth (1996), Claire Cutler (2003), Charles Leben (2003), 
Rubén Tempone (2003), Bernardo Cremades (2004), M. Sornarajah (2004) and 
Gus van Harten (2007a; 2007b), among many others, ICSID arbitration displays 
some international and public aspects that should be borne in mind. Firstly, the 
organization was created through an international treaty and its principles, 
procedures and substantive rules result from the will of states; secondly, unlike in 
most international arbitration schemes, it is possible to bring annulment procedures 
to be decided by ad hoc committees; and thirdly, though parties have complete 
freedom to choose arbitrators, if they fail to do so the person must be selected 
from a roster established by member states. A handful of additional special features 
could be mentioned, such as the rules of immunity and enforcement, but they are 
not very relevant to the present study. 
Since the study of the body of nominated arbitrators and members of ad hoc 
committees is the subject matter of this paper, it is important to describe, briefly, 
the formal procedures for their selection: (1) each party choose one arbitrator, not 
necessarily from the roster; (2) 
if any party fail to do so, the ICSID chairperson (the President of the World Bank), 
on the demand of the other party, chooses an arbitrator from the roster, who 
cannot be national of any of the parties in the controversy (Washington Convention, 
Articles 38 and 40); (3) 
the third arbitrator, who is the president, is appointed by agreement of the parties; 
(4) if they fail to appoint the president, the chairperson chooses him or her, as 
described in (2); and (5) the members of ad hoc committees, always numbering 
three, are designated by the chairperson and shall not “have been a member of the 
                                                 
2 UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/ITT/2004/2, p. 7. 
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Tribunal which rendered the [challenged] award, (…) be of the same nationality as 
any such member, (…) be a national of the State party to the disputes or of the 
State whose national is a party to the dispute, (…) have been designated to the 
Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or (…) have acted as conciliator in the 
same dispute” (Washington Convention, Article 52 (3)). 
So, the parties play a central role in the nomination of the arbitrators and 
presidents of tribunals, while the chairperson acts only complementarily in this 
matter, but is the one who designates, from the roster (the “Panel of Arbitrators”), 
the members of ad hoc committees. 
 
1.2. Dispute settlement in the WTO 
The legend is well known: at the beginning, there were the diplomats, bound to the 
Realpolitik and ruthless masters of power games. Nevertheless, step by step, 
bureaucrats and lawyers concerned with a deeper institutionalization, filled each 
and every power vacuum left behind by political fissures among diplomats, until, 
through the WTO agreements, the power-based decision-making system was 
replaced by a rule-oriented one (JACKSON, 1997; 2009; YOUNG, 1995). However, 
like any oversimplified narrative, it is both true and false. 
In fact, it is possible to identify an increasing institutionalization that could be 
described in terms of more differentiation and specialization of organs and bodies, 
clearer rules, defined and shorter terms, and compulsory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
some aspects should be stressed to allow a better understanding of the 
transformation of the dispute resolution system. Firstly, despite what the dichotomy 
between power oriented and rule oriented decision making systems may suggest, 
there is no clear boundary that separates these two categories, nor any historical 
process involving an immediate change from one to the other. Secondly, the actual 
process of increasing institutionalization cannot be described as a smooth path 
towards a steady improvement, but as a complex evolution driven by conflicts and 
tensions, as well as marked by stalls and setbacks. 
However, the WTO’s DSS changed profondly the approach to resolution of 
international trade disputes. Several aspects of the DSS are strengthened by the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of 
the WTO (USD), such as timetables, monitoring procedures and formal criteria for 
the choice of panelists. However, three changes produced the most important 
impact: (1) the need for a consensual decision of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), a political organ composed by the representatives of all members, to 
reverse a decision of a panel or the AB; (2) the compulsory submission of disputes 
to the jurisdiction of the DSS; and (3) the creation of an AB, which though in formal 
terms not a kind of supreme court, performs a very similar role. 
The GATT system required the consent of all the CONTRACTING PARTIES to adopt a 
decision of a panel for it to become an international obligation and, as could be 
expected, this was virtually impossible, since the defeated party in the procedure 
was always able to block the adoption by its negative vote. Since the WTO system 
reversed the consensus rule, neither a single member, nor any kind of majority, 
can now block the conversion of a panel or AB report into a decision of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) – a political organ composed by all WTO members – as well 
as the authorization by this organ of the suspension of concessions and 
implementation of compensatory measures: only the consensus of all WTO 
members, included the winner, may reverse the results of a panel. Consequently, 
the political process of the discussion of the reports of panels, which under the 
GATT system was the way to push a contracting party to suspend a measure found 
to be invalid, is no longer a bar to the adoption of reports, though it still performs 
the role of a discussion forum. Moreover, the control of states over dispute 
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settlement was also reduced by the obligatory jurisdiction, and by the more 
effective procedure for the selection of panelists if the parties do not reach an 
agreement. 
The negative consensus rule, however, was foreseen by the negotiators of the WTO 
agreements as giving too much power to panels and, consequently, the AB was 
established as a counterweight. Originally it was expected that appellate procedures 
would be rare (HUDEC, 1999; HUGHES, 2009), but this was not confirmed by the 
actual caseload and it became normal to ask for review of panel reports. 
Moreover, although established as an organ that was expected to be mostly 
inactive and meaning nothing more than a part time job for its members, the AB 
adopted a very proactive attitude toward the affirmation of its authority and 
importance. This took the form of (1) rules of the Working Procedures of the 
Appellate Body (WPAB) that aimed at the construction of internal consensus and 
gave an exceptional character to dissenting votes and opinions, mainly through 
collegiality (ÁLVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ, 2009); and (2) a strong commitment, informally 
established by the original members, to keep the eventual disagreements to 
internal discussions, and to project an image of legal and technical consistency to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the organ (LACARTE-MURÓ, 2007), which established 
the basis for a culture that seems to have been inherited by the succeeding 
generations of members. 
Therefore, it may be asserted that the legal character of the WTO’s DSS was 
reinforced both by (1) the weakening of political legitimation through the DSB due 
to the shift towards negative consensus and (2) the successful search by the AB for 
technical and formalist legitimacy. 
However, this does not necessarily means that the power oriented or diplomatic 
nature of the DSS has faded away, since the political processes of selection of 
members of panels and AB may influence the decisions. A closer look at the profiles 
of decision makers is proposed here as a way to understand in more completely the 
actual meaning of these procedural and institutional changes. However, this paper 
focuses on members of panels because, due to their ad hoc nature, the nominations 
to them are more sensitive to reactive adjustments, and they also provide a far 
larger population. 
It is also necessary to make clear that the procedures for choosing panelists are 
quite different from those of ICSID’s system3: (1) Since a panel is established by 
the DSB, the Secretary proposes the panel composition to the parties, who can 
accept or reject the whole panel, not the individual members; (2) a party must give 
reasons for any rejection; (3) after a rejection, the secretary presents a new panel 
proposal, which may also be rejected; (4) the Director General appoints the 
members of a panel if (a) 20 days have elapsed since the establishment of the 
panel by the DSB and (b) a party files a request; (5) there is a list of potential 
panelists maintained by the WTO Secretariat, consisting of people nominated by 
member states, but need not be the source for either the Secretary’s or the 
Director General’s appointments. 
In the GATT system panels could be nominated only with the agreement of the 
parties to the dispute. After the adoption of the WTO’s DSS, nominations by the 
Director General became quite common and account for about 67% of the panels 
composed from 1995 to 2009. 
 
                                                 
3 The description presented here follows the written rules of the DSU, though in practice the real 
procedures differ sharply from them, as described by James Flett in his contribution to this collection. 
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2. Terminology and criteria of data collection 
This paper generally follows the terms employed by the international conventions 
that constitute ICSID and the WTO DSS. Consequently: 
1.  “panelist” is a person nominated to a WTO panel; 
2.  “member of the AB” is a person appointed to the WTO’s Appellate Body; 
3.  “arbitrator”, unless distinguished in the context, is used in this paper as 
meaning a sole arbitrator, a member of an ICSID tribunal, including the 
president, or a member of an ad hoc committee, since all these categories 
have merged into the same general population; 
4.  “president” is the president of an ICSID tribunal and is so designated only 
to distinguish him or her from “regular arbitrators”; and 
5. “member of an ad hoc committee” is a person designated to such an ICSID 
annulment committee. 
The population studied is composed of all nominations between 1995 and 2009 to 
WTO panels, ICSID arbitrations and ICSID annulment procedures. A nomination is 
the mention of the name of the panelist, arbitrator or member of ad hoc committee 
on the official website of the WTO or the ICSID.  
Both nominations and people are classified in four categories: 
Legal background: means a university degree or professional studies in law, 
admission to the bar, work as counsel or work as judge;  
Governmental service: work as diplomat, judge, minister, state attorney, 
prosecutor, congressperson, a position in state agencies or state companies, and a 
representative in international conferences; however, consultancy or advisory 
services to states or state agencies or companies are not considered as 
governmental service; 
Academia: work as professor, dean, president, coordinator, lecturer or tenured 
researcher in universities or research institutes; however, publications in journals 
and reviews, editorial work, lectures and addresses outside university or research 
institutes and other activities alike are not considered to be academic service; and 
Private: partnership or work in law firms, private companies, consultancy firms, 
think-tanks, as well as any occupation not covered by (2) or (3). 
The categories are not logically exclusive, which means that a single individual may 
belong to all 4 sets. Moreover, though category 4 is residual in relation to 2 or 3, 
the inclusion of an individual therein is not automatic in the sense that it requires a 
positive mention of the membership of the person in a law firm or other private 
occupation. 
The list of individuals is the one made available in the official websites. ICSID 
arbitrators are those nominated in the pending and concluded cases in the links of 
the webpage http://icsid.worldbank.org. WTO panelists are those nominated in 
documents named “constitution of the panel” that can be found in 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_documents_e.htm. The 
name, as indicated in the websites, is an individual. A set of identical names is 
treated as a single person. When the names are not identical due to presentation 
styles, change of a maiden name or material errors, they have been united under a 
single person. 
Links between the names and the categories defined by the above criteria were 
made through an internet search using the Google search engine, and a 
complementary search in the Lexis-Nexis database. Only data from official websites 
of (1) states or international organizations; (2) universities or institutes; (3) legal 
firms; (4) private companies; and (5) personal pages or (6) obituaries in reviews or 
newspapers, have been used. 
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The search was performed using the following protocol: 
1. Google search with the complete name as a single argument, such as in 
“Brigitte Stern”; 
2. If no relevant match was found, a Google search with the name separated in 
as many arguments as applicable, such as “Brigitte” “Stern”; 
3. In any case, if the set of Google matches is very high or homonymous 
persons were found, the following arguments were added to (2): “WTO”, 
“ICSID”, “law”, “legal”, “LLP”, “professor”, “ambassador”, “university”, 
“arbitrator”, “arbitration”, “trade”, “investment” and “international”, as well 
as the corresponding terms in French and Spanish. The auxiliary languages 
were chosen since they are used in the WTO (French and Spanish) and 
ICSID (French) websites; 
4. There were some relevant websites that did not confirm the relation 
between the name and the participation as arbitrator or panelist. These 
matches have not been actually excluded, though due attention was paid to 
possible mistakes and some subjective discretion was used in these cases, 
for instance to distinguish an immigration lawyer in Miami from a 
homonymous Ecuadorian diplomat. The use of such subjective criteria was 
applied in under 2% of collected data; 
5. The Lexis-Nexis database was used as an ancillary search tool to help 
narrow the sets of names as well as to find people whose profile was not 
found using Google; and 
6. All relevant data has been collected between March 1st and July 1st 2010. 
 
3. Concentration by nominations and cases 
Repeated nominations of the same person are far more common among ICSID 
arbitrators than among WTO panelists. Assuming homogeneous distributions and 
an unlimited number of potential people (those whose social and cultural capital is 
enough to make a nomination possible, though were not nominated), it would be 
expected that the average number of times each person is nominated (the 
repetition rate) would be 1.0. Figures over 1.0 indicate a more selective choice, 
which means the use of criteria that restrict the set of potential individuals. 
Consequently, the higher a repetition rate is, the narrower the entrance gate.  
There are 863 nominations and 273 people in the set of ICSID arbitrators and 430 
nominations and 212 people in the set of WTO panelists; hence, the repetition rates 
are 3.2 and 2.0, respectively. If the set of potential people were the same for both, 
the higher level of repetition would be easily explained by the bigger size of the 
ICSID set, roughly double that of the WTO. However, since the overlap between 
both sets of individuals is relatively low, as shown below, there is no reason to 
presuppose that the repetition rates are a function of the size of populations in the 
case under analysis, and it is correct to assert that the higher rate indicates a 
higher selectivity. 
The distribution of nominations among arbitrators also points at interesting 
differences between ICSID and WTO systems. For instance, group of only 12 
arbitrators (4.4%) of the ICSID population accounts for about a quarter of 
nominations, while 17 of WTO panelists (7,65%) respond for the analogous 
quartile. Graph 2 shows the proportions of panelists and arbitrators divided into 
four quartiles that represent the four respective groups of more often nominated 
people. For each DSS, the total of nominations has been divided into four parts, 
which were distributed to the four sets of arbitrators and panelists, organized 
accordingly to their respective numbers of nominations. So, the first quartile of 
each column represents the group of people who were nominated most often and 
account for a quarter of the whole set of nominations, and so on. It suggests the 
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conclusion that an élite accounts for a higher proportion of nominations in ICSID 
than in WTO DSS. 
 
Graph 2 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it is also important to observe that the 12 people (first quartile) who 
account for over a quarter of the ICSID nominations are present in 60% of the 
tribunals, i.e. in 158 out of 263 tribunals. In other words, the group of more 
frequent arbitrators spreads their influence not only on a quarter of tribunals, but 
well over half of them. 
Which could be the reasons for this? Though other hypotheses are possible, two of 
the more obvious are discussed briefly below. 
Who nominates? Since it is not possible to know how many arbitrators have been 
nominated by parties or by the ICSID chairperson, it is not possible to compare 
these figures with the WTO rate of nomination by the Director General, which 
covers 63% of the population. Nevertheless, it is correct to presuppose a minimum 
of 33% and a maximum of 90% of nominations by parties to ICSID, since it would 
be very odd that the claimant fails to nominate an arbitrator to the tribunals, and 
the ad hoc committees, which represent about 10% of the population, are entirely 
nominated by the chairperson. Though this range is very wide, the maximum of 
estimated nominations by the chairperson – 67%  – is not very far from the 
effective WTO rate, but it is very reasonable to expect that in ICSID the choice by 
parties is far more common than by the chairperson. Consequently, if it is correct to 
suppose that the choices of a person or an organ are more prone to fall into a 
stricter group of possibilities, a higher concentration in WTO panels would be 
expected, which does not happen at all. On the other hand, since parties put their 
interests at stake in dispute settlement by third parties, it may be expected that 
they prefer, in order to manage risks, to appoint an arbitrator or panelist whose 
behavior is predictable on the basis of former judgments. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by the data. 
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Leadership and institutionalization. The WTO DSS and ICSID arbitration involve 
different degrees of institutionalization. The WTO’s normative system comprises a 
single comprehensive set of substantive rules, the entire regulation of procedures 
and mandatory instruments to establish panels and enforce decisions. The ICSID 
only organizes arbitration; the substantive and procedural rules may be determined 
by the parties in the disputes. Though it is most common to use ICSID’s own 
arbitration rules, the sets of substantive rules and consent to arbitration varies. In 
a less regulated and institutionally weaker system – FIPPAs/ICSID – a strong non-
formal leadership is more necessary, since legitimacy must be asserted case by 
case, as well as being easier to establish, since there is no competition between an 
informal elite and the bureaucratic bodies. Since social cohesion based on face-to-
face relations or shared consensus are supposedly an inverse function of the 
number of members of the group, frequent arbitrators would be able to become a 
hard core, reinforced by high rates of social direct interactions and networks of 
diffusion of behavioural standards. A more institutionalized DSS scheme does not 
need such an underlying social structure. 
These hypotheses are not incompatible and it is possible to identify the parties’ 
interest in controlling risks as a push towards a higher selectivity based both on the 
valuation of experience and predictability of behaviour as positive assets. 
Nevertheless, the small number of leading arbitrators also enables them to 
reinforce their habitus through face-to-face encounters not only in the tribunals (63 
interactions4 in ICSID tribunals) but also in other arenas, such as conferences and 
associations. At the same time, they spread an habitus through interactions with 
other arbitrators – 411 out of 726 interactions in ICSID tribunals – in several 
environments. Curiously, the number of interactions that involve any of the 12 
most nominated arbitrators – 474 – represents 60% of the total of interactions, as 
showed in Graph 3, suggesting plenty of opportunities to reinforce habitus. 
 
Graph 3 
 
                                                 
4 An interaction is defined here as a nomination of two arbitrators to the same tribunal, discarding 
arbitrators who resigned or left the tribunal for any other reason. There are an aggregate of 789 
interactions. This does not mean, however, an actual interaction in audiences or gatherings, since every 
nomination – even the ones to tribunals that did not start functioning due to a negotiated solution – 
have been taken into account. 
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4.Population Overlaps 
The comparison between the ICSID and WTO lists of arbitrators, members of ad 
hoc committees, panelists and AB members shows a relatively narrow set of 
persons who have participated in both systems. The number of people who were 
nominated to ICSID tribunals and committees is 273, while 212 people take part in 
WTO panels. Nevertheless, the overlap is of only 8 people. Considering the number 
of individuals, this set represents 2.8% of WTO individuals and 4.7% of ICSID’s. 
However, when the ICSID nominees are compared to the WTO’s AB members a 
very different picture arises: the overlap reaches the number of 6 persons. This still 
represents a relatively thin slice of ICSID’s tribunals – only 2.4% of 
individuals.However, it represents 28.8% of past and present AB members, a far 
more significant figure. 
The list of overlaps includes, as can be seen in Table 1, one of the leading ICSID 
arbitrators (Orrego Vicuña) but none of the most common panelists. Interestingly, 
the designation to be a member of the AB seems to be an asset to start arbitrating 
investment disputes because out of 21 nominations, apart from one, that of Luiz 
Olavo Baptista in 1997, all others happened after nomination to the AB, 15 during 
the process and 5 thereafter. 
 
Table 1 
  ICSID WTO WTO - AB 
Armand de Mestral 1 1 0 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann 1 0 1 
David Unterhalter  4 3 0 
Florentino P. Feliciano 6 1 1 
Francisco Orrego Vicuña 22 1 0 
Georges Abi-Saab 7 0 1 
Giorgio Sacerdoti 4 0 1 
Gonzalo Biggs 1 3 0 
Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez 4 1 0 
Luiz Olavo Baptista 2 1 1 
Merit Janow 1 1 1 
 
The leadership hypothesis above is, again, useful to interpret these data. The 
Appellate Body plays a very important role for the assertion of the legal legitimacy 
of WTO’s DSS and the choice of its members reflects the need to reach supposedly 
high standards of technical precision and quality. For its higher dispute resolution 
technical body, WTO also needs people who contribute to the institution as they 
bring their personal cultural assets to it. 
Nevertheless, the sequential analysis of nominations points in quite a different 
direction: the exercise of a prestigious international function backed by the 
approval of states is an important asset to enter arbitration, while previous links to 
commercial and investment arbitration does not seem to be important to step into 
WTO’s courtroom. 
This means that leadership from the arbitration field is not easily transferred to 
WTO’s institutions and, as a matter of fact, the AB gains no extra prestige in 
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including experienced investment arbitrators. Reputation flows – as the data 
suggest – from the WTO to arbitration and not in the other direction. 
 
5.Legal background 
Virtually all ICSID arbitrators and ad hoc committees members have some legal 
background, since only 0.4% of the whole population is of individuals who had not 
at least studied law. On the other hand, WTO figures are very different: 45% of 
panelists and 10% of AB members have no links to any legal background or 
professional activity. 
However, the participation of individuals with legal backgrounds has increased in 
WTO panels, as shown in Graph 4, and it is also important to draw attention to the 
fact that the number of panels with no member having a law degree or legal 
experience tends to zero, as Graph 5 shows. In fact, from 2005 to 2009 only a 
single panel out of 37 (2.7%) has no such member. 
In fact, the hypothesis of a growing legalization of WTO’s DSS has grown stronger 
over the years, though it is not possible yet to assert that there is a clear tendency 
towards a complete takeover by panelists with a legal background. Though it is 
sometimes asserted that the normative structure of WTO instituted the legalization 
of the international trade system (Young 1995; Jackson 1997), the complete 
construction of a legal field depends on the social establishment of a specific way to 
deal with rules and institutions to legitimate power relations under the veil of 
neutral and correct application of a corpus of principles and rules. The increasing 
appointment of people with legal backgrounds to WTO panels seems highly 
motivated by the need to change from a legitimating scheme based on the political 
compromise between countries’ representatives to a legal system that depends on 
interpretative skills and legal training to be properly driven, since legality is now 
assured by the AB, closely watched by a global public – the new audience of 
legitimating actors. 
However, there are significant differences in the figures of arbitrators and panelists 
with legal backgrounds. Would it not be expected that a less formalized system, 
such as that of the FIPPAs/ICSID, would need less legal specialization, since appeal 
and annulment procedures are looser and the free choice of parties may prefer 
specialists other than jurists? Why, comparing both systems, does the less 
institutionalized one need more people with legal backgrounds than the other? 
Proper responses to these questions cannot be provided without looking at the 
historical construction of both systems and, particularly, at the inertial effects 
present in the transformation of the GATT into the WTO. 
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Graph 4 
Yearly average of WTO panelists with legal background
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Graph 5 
Panels without individuals holding legal background 
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The WTO panels come from GATT panels, which traditionally were composed of 
Geneva trade diplomats. When the new system entered into force, there were 
inertial momentums which kept diplomats as the main operators of the DSS. In 
fact, experience in former panels – though under a different regime – and expertise 
in trade issues represent, at least at first, assets more valuable than legal 
knowledge and experience in judicial or arbitral procedures. Nevertheless, as will be 
discussed later, the presence and functioning of the AB, which resembles a court of 
appeal, created pressures towards a wider resort to legal personnel, who also 
gained experience and expertise in international trade disputes. 
Investment adjudication, on the other hand, has its ties with commercial 
arbitration. Though, from a legal viewpoint, investment arbitration must be clearly 
distinguished from the commercial variant, the most frequent investment 
arbitrators usually take part in that kind of private dispute resolution as well. 
Certainly, a substantial change happened in investment arbitration since the early 
1990s, as can be easily perceived from Graph 1 above, but it can be interpreted as 
a mere quantitative change triggered by the weakening of political West-East 
tensions since the fall of the Berlin Wall, that left almost unchallenged the strong 
links to commercial arbitration and the high value of cultural assets such as 
experience in arbitration, academic credentials and a personal reputation for 
impartiality.  
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Since the DSS for investment is, today, institutionally as dense as ever and each 
case is politically sensitive for the host country, the need to build legitimacy on a 
case by case basis demands a professional profile of arbitrators who can provide 
technically correct decisions and the special aura given by sanctified arbitrators. 
The history of the WTO’s DSS is quite different, since deep institutional changes 
happened after the GATT period and an institutionally denser decision making 
scheme does not need to be operated by arbitration stars; moreover, the inertial 
presence of specialized diplomats may be retained by the organizational 
bureaucracy. 
6. Professional profiles 
After the interpretation of population overlaps and the distribution of the legal 
background, a higher rate of individuals who have held public positions, such as 
diplomats and judges, is expected among panelists than ICSID arbitrators. In fact, 
as shown in Graphs 6 and 7, the distribution among the three professional 
categories is quite different in panels and arbitration tribunals. The multiple profiles 
have been treated cumulatively, since, firstly, the influence of a professional profile 
as cultural capital is assumed to increase in tandem and, secondly, the accuracy 
would not increase through the application of criteria to determine predominant 
profiles, since the mixes also vary from very clear to quite blurred distributions for 
each person. 
Graph 6 
WTO panelists by professional background
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Graph 7 
ICSID arbitrators by professional background
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Also as observed above, more extensive transformations in the professional mix are 
to be expected among WTO panelists than among ICSID arbitrators. These 
tendencies can be seen in Graphs 8 and 9. 
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Graph 8 
WTO - professional distribution - 1995 to 2009
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Graph 9 
ICSID - Professional distribution - averages
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The evolution of WTO panels’ professional distribution shows no clear pattern, at 
least not as clear as the growth of panelists holding legal background. So, the 
steady growth of the proportion of legal panelists cannot be strongly linked to the 
growth of academics or lawyers: this seems to happen clearly in the early years, 
when the increase of legal personnel is complementary to the decline of public – 
mainly diplomatic – careers. However, the data as a whole tell a different story: a 
stable high rate of individuals from public service associated with a growing rate of 
individuals having any legal background suggests that a substantial part of the 
“legalization of panelists” is due to the preferential choice of diplomats with legal 
diplomas. To illustrate this tendency, Graph 10 compares the averages of the 
population with legal background with the average of the population from public 
services. 
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Graph 10 
WTO - public service and legal background 
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Regarding ICSID tribunals, indeed, the professional distribution seems more stable 
throughout the years. It is interesting, however, to stress that multiple profiles 
have always been very common in this DSS, while less frequent in WTO panels. The 
average of professional affiliation by individual is 2.0 in ICSID tribunals and 1.3 in 
WTO panels. 
It is possible to interpret the different rates of multiple profiles as related to the 
strength of institutionalization in both DSSs. As discussed in relation to legal 
backgrounds and the overlap of populations, in investment arbitration there is a 
more frequent need to stress the legitimacy of arbitration tribunals. A double or 
triple profile may enhance the confidence in the arbitration, since the strengths of 
each activity may be invoked for the sake of technical correctness and moral 
rectitude. In fact, 90% (95% from 2005 to 2009) of ICSID arbitration tribunals and 
ad hoc committees combine the three professional links. So, should also be 
stressed that this factor is important to affirm legitimacy against the argument that 
these tribunals entail a privatization of dispute resolution. There is not enough data 
to assert this, but the triple profiles could hardly be regarded as an element of a 
structure devoted to equating private and public interests, mediated by neutral 
academics, and legitimating discourses may be constructed around this. 
 
7. ICSID’s arbitration and the construction of a legal field 
As initially stated, Bourdieu’s notion of legal fields is constructed around domestic 
legal systems where it is easy to recognize a relatively strong and clear 
centralization of the use of force in the state. Hence, legal fields are designed to 
legitimate state power structures through a discourse of technical correctness, 
ideological neutrality and impartiality. 
Investment arbitration, though resulting from international public instruments such 
as the FIPPAs and the ICSID, cannot be viewed as organizing itself in the same way 
as a domestic legal system. There is no state power to legitimate, nor any kind of 
centralized power. There is no need to replace, or disguise, crude force through 
symbolic violence. So, the FIPPA/ICSID system articulates power in a distinct 
fashion, mainly by restricting state powers to regulate foreign investments and 
investors, since standards and rules are established in the treaties to protect them 
against excessive exercise of state powers. In other words, the legitimacy of the 
system still deals with the classical problem of capitulations régimes, diplomatic 
protection and autonomous lex mercatoria: how to deal with disputes outside the 
states’ statutory and judicial structures and maintain an aura of fairness and 
correctness. 
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The sanctions behind FIPPAs – payment of compensation and loss of international 
confidence – are not dealt with in the same way as in criminal convictions or civil 
judgments, which are orders to use state force. Due to sovereign immunities from 
jurisdiction and enforcement it is not easy to ensure the payment of compensation 
by states and, in fact, it is far more common that countries pay in good faith, or at 
least due to the fear of international discredit and negative effects on investment 
inflows. So even compensation ultimately relies upon reputational sanctions and 
doubtful awards may be highly damaging. 
The role of investment arbitration, therefore, is to offer technical legitimacy (1) in 
each and every case as well as (2) to the FIPPAs/ICSID system. Consequently, 
there is a great need for arbitrators who are technically qualified and beyond any 
doubt, to give support to a discourse of fairness and rectitude. That is, probably, 
one of the reasons for the immediate strong reactions against any attempt to even 
discuss bias in investment arbitration by leading international legal experts in these 
issues. 
Consequently, the legitimating discourse is centered on the image of arbitrators 
who are highly technically prepared, who have outstanding careers as professors 
and lawyers, though sometimes also having some former experience in public 
affairs. The guarantee against possible bias or corruption, it is argued, comes 
exactly from (1) the relatively low role arbitration plays in individual careers, 
though most arbitrators now declare themselves to be such, contrarily to the 
“grand old men” of an earlier generation, and (2) the need to keep the technical 
and moral reputation beyond any doubt. Since the parties play the main role in the 
selection of arbitrators and nomination by ICSID organs is quite rare, strategies to 
be renominated do not focus on the international or domestic bureaucracy, but on 
the projection of an image of high standards of knowledge and morality associated 
with professional networking. 
Since there is no strong institutional basis, nor a stable bureaucracy, it is necessary 
and easier to construct web networks based on leadership. In fact, as shown in 
section 4, a small group of arbitrators constitute a legal elite, incorporating the 
spirit of international arbitration and being directly responsible for the confidence in 
the system. 
It is possible to hypothesize that the centrality of the legal field of international 
protection of foreign investment is defined by these leaders, who are not faceless 
and disseminate patterns of career structure and professional commitments that 
are constitutive of an habitus followed in less central parts of the field. 
At this point, the overlap between ICSID and WTO populations is very revealing: 
though there is little overlap between arbitrators and panelists, the number of AB 
members who are nominated as ICSID arbitrators is very high and suggests that 
the social status associated with the arbitrators is higher than that of panelists and, 
moreover, that very central positions in the trade legal field are not separated from 
that of investment, since they give prestige and legitimacy to the investment field, 
as the timing of appointments show. 
So, the strategies relating to international adjudication on foreign investments do 
not happen in a highly institutionalized environment. Therefore, the system 
depends very much on the personal characteristics of the decision makers, as well 
as on the discourse that distinguishes investment cases from domestic affairs as 
well as from interstate relations. Since the defence of the field and the struggles for 
centrality therein must be performed at the same time, due to the absence of a 
centralized jurisdiction, the formalism appropriate to the legitimating processes 
through symbolic violence and a strong depoliticization are performed by the 
identification of the technical use of a legal corpus and the decision making 
processes. There is no judge presupposed to be legitimate; arbitrators, and 
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investment arbitrators in particular, contribute the legitimating capabilities from 
their personal curricula. 
 
8. WTO’s DSS and the construction of a legal field 
The AB was created as a substitute for the political control by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES of the GATT. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the political organ of 
the WTO that needs a consensus to reject a panel or AB report, has no competence 
to verify that the panel decisions are confirmed by the proactive strategy of AB 
members. Moreover, the recourse to this organ proved far more common than 
expected. In its first two years there was no case which was not appealed and the 
historical average of recourse to appeals is 68% (WTO 2010). 
It is very common, therefore, that panel reports are challenged. This situation 
pushes both panelists and other bureaucratic bodies – such as the Secretariat and 
the Director-General – to pursue compliance with the AB’s precedents. As the 
surveyed data suggest, the growth of the share of panelists with a legal background 
may be a reaction to the prevalence of appeals and the need to comply with the 
AB’s standards. 
The chronological analysis of panels data reveals a steady trend of growth of the 
share of the population with (1) a legal background and (2) panels where at least 
one of the members presents this feature. These aspects, however, do not strongly 
counterbalance the preponderance of diplomats as WTO panelists, since their share 
of the population seems to have stabilized at around 80%. 
Strategies of adaptation performed by the choice of specific profiles when 
nominating panelists, considering that the AB built its legitimacy through a 
formalist legal approach akin to the symbolic violence of domestic legal fields, face 
some important conditions. These are: (1) convincing parties to the dispute became 
less important in the WTO’s DSS since it became virtually impossible to block DSB 
decisions and the legal discourse gained momentum as a legitimating tool; and (2) 
since the AB became the new audience to be convinced by the panelists, not the 
DSB, a legal background was transformed into a valuable asset, since it facilitates 
adherence to the AB’s precedents, though they are not formally obligatory.  
The legalist approach, characterized by the objectivist epistemology and formalist 
style adopted by the AB (PICCIOTTO 2005), is backed by technical legal parameters 
that are very similar to domestic ones. In this sense, and considering that the 
composition of panels reacts steadily in order to adapt to the more legalist 
standards, it is possible to assert that the institutional changes since 1994 modified 
the DSS of international trade in a way that increased the institutionalization and 
legalization of international institutions, resulting in an organizational support for 
the formation of an international legal field. However, the predominance of 
diplomats in the population of panelists could be regarded with suspicion: could it 
be a way to reintroduce political control through the backdoor? 
At first sight, an affirmative response to this question seems completely correct. 
Yes, to control outcomes by opting for profiles that are both adapted to the 
formalist legal discourse and the political constraints of governmental activities 
stabilizes cognitive expectations of the field. The claim to political neutrality of state 
judges, which enables technical legitimacy through legal discourse, does not mean 
any actual lack of a political dimension. Bourdieu’s field theory shows this clearly, 
revealing that power disputes occur all over legal fields; both as internal conflicts 
for centrality and influence and as an external struggle for legitimacy. The presence 
of diplomats with a legal background in panels is an element of a strategy towards 
external legitimacy through formalization and stabilization of expectations coherent 
with state goals.  
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It is not yet bureaucratically controlled by its own judges, as in some domestic 
systems, and the ad hoc character of the panelists’ nomination means that these 
organs remain very far from a professionalized judiciary. However, the choice of 
diplomats with legal backgrounds offers (1) stabilization due to homogeneous 
profiles and experiences that may substitute, at least partially, for the sense of 
corporate cohesion of jurisdictional groups as well as (2) relatively low pressures on 
panelists to seek to be renominated, as well as low temptations to be corrupted, 
since the public wages are generally stable and participation in international 
tribunals is no more than a compliment, and (3) a reasonable balance between the 
political experience of diplomatic careers and the legal background that values 
positively formalist legitimating schemes. 
So, the differentiation among lawyers, professors and diplomats, with the 
predominance of the latter in the panels, are elements of resemblance to domestic 
legal fields, not of an odd process schizophrenically divided between lawyers and 
diplomats. The predominance of diplomats with legal backgrounds in the population 
of panelists is, therefore, indicative of the construction of an international legal field 
through the institutionalization performed by states through international 
organizations. 
The WTO’s DSS looks very much like domestic legal systems. Legitimating 
discourses are strongly based on depoliticization, namely that which results from 
the negative consensus rule and the centrality of the AB’s role. The diminution of 
the DSB’s powers to obstruct the adoption of panel or AB reports, as well as 
countervailing and compensatory measures, is generally seem as a legalizing 
process that replaced politics between state representatives in large assemblies. As 
was stressed, this does not mean that the functioning of a legal system is a purely 
technical, non-political process. However, the use of symbolic violence and the 
articulation of the legal field, including the aspects resulting from the specialization 
of its operators, are clearly political. The legitimating process, contrarily to what 
happens in arbitration, does not depend on the quality of the decision makers, but 
on the quality of the system as a neutral and technical one. Access struggles and 
strategies to reach the field’s center, consequently, are less linked to a strategy to 
maintain the system as a whole. 
 9.Legal fields in ICSID and WTO 
This concluding section, loosely summarized in Table 2, aims to bring together the 
partial discussions and conclusions expressed so far. Beginning with the concepts of 
legitimacy and field, it discusses further how the data about arbitrators and 
panelists’ profiles shed some light on important questions about how international 
legal fields are constructed and how they perform their legitimating roles in 
different ways in the investment and trade legal arenas. 
As discussed above, the notion of legal field deals with two separate, though 
complementary, sets of questions, namely (1) the way power is legitimated through 
the symbolic violence that derives from the social action of judges, lawyers and 
academics and (2) the way people belonging to the field help to establish its 
structure through the competition for inclusion and centrality cemented in habitus 
and strategies that result both in good results in terms of legitimacy (strengthening 
the field) and successful careers. 
The set of data presented here aims to help understand features of the habitus in 
each field, as well as which, and how, cultural capital may be earned inside or 
outside the field, and be imported into it. Data on the concentration and overlap of 
populations help to understand how closed a field is, suggesting that a higher 
amount of cultural assets may be necessary to take part in it and, consequently, 
that the habitus is more sophisticated and under stricter control. In this regard, 
considering the set of arbitrators and panelists, investment dispute settlement 
seems to be more demanding on its participants. 
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However, WTO dispute settlement is a far more institutionalized system. Hence, is 
is necessary to bear in mind that panelists are quite different from AB members, 
while arbitrators and ad hoc committees members are more homogeneous. There 
are some structural differences that help to explain why there is a strong hierarchy 
between panels and the AB, and quite a loose one, if any, between ICSID tribunals 
and annulment committees. Firstly, the AB is a permanent body, while, as indicated 
by their names, committees are ad hoc. This marks very clear boundaries between 
panelists and AB members, which are blurred in the investment arbitration world. 
Secondly, appeal is almost the default response to panel reports while annulment is 
very exceptional. Consequently, if arbitrators feel free to decide as they want, 
panelists and lawyers are supposed to pay attention to former AB decisions, a fact 
that is reinforced by the permanence of this organ. Thirdly, investment arbitration 
is less functionally specialized. This is because it is quite common that lawyers wear 
two hats, as arbitrators (or panelists) in some cases and counsel in others. Since 
the average of lawyers in the arbitrators’ population is 76% and only 19% among 
panelists, it is easy to conclude that trade panelists and trade lawyers come from 
completely different origins, and also reasonable to surmise that the overlap 
between investment arbitrators and counsel is much higher. 
Therefore, conclusions about arbitrators reveal more about the whole field of 
investment dispute settlement than panelists’ profiles reveal about the WTO DSS’s 
effective operation. Nevertheless, the much higher functional specialization of 
dispute resolution on trade along with the steadily increasing number of panelists 
with legal backgrounds help to tell the story of a successful legal institutionalization 
that resembles domestic legal fields much more than the blurred and fuzzy 
architecture of international arbitration. 
However, the picture of ICSID’s arbitration that the data help to develop shows 
profiles which are very stable along the chronological axis, both as to the presence 
of arbitrators with legal backgrounds and also regarding the triple balanced 
distribution between lawyers, public servants and academics. It is true that 
historical inertia and the close ties to commercial arbitration are elements that help 
to explain this stability in comparison with panelists. However, there is no visible 
pressure towards a more institutionalized system. This suggests that the self-
regulated legal network that composes the legal field of international dispute 
settlement on investment issues, though importing domestic cultures and 
credentials, does not push changes in the direction of an international legal 
institution more similar to the domestic one; or, in other words, its stable figures 
and features suggest that further institutionalization depends on new sets of rules 
being imposed from outside the field. 
 
Table 2 
  ICSID WTO 
Legal technological skills + + + 
Other technological skills 0 + 
Multiple careers + + + 
Functional specialization 0 ++ 
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Concentration by quarters  + + + 
Changes 0 + + 
Privatization + 0 
Field consolidation + + + 
Institutionalization + + + 
 
The analysis of profiles of arbitrators and panel members does point to different 
forms of field construction and operation. The arbitrators’ star system is very 
different from the bureaucratic profiles of most of the WTO’s panelists. 
There seems to be a strong structural relation between the firm formal 
institutionalization of the WTO’s DSS and its operational resemblance to domestic 
systems, as well as of the loose institutionalization of investment arbitration and, 
consequently, the resort to an allegedly technical legal legitimacy, which is a 
possible substitute for legally established organizations. To use the Weberian ideal-
type legitimating schemes, it could be said that the WTO system stays close to 
bureaucratic and formalized rational legitimacy, while investment arbitration seeks 
more support from charisma (maybe through the special attributes of arbitrators) 
and tradition (maybe from the strong links to commercial arbitration). Curiously, 
however, one of the most important claims in the legitimating discourse of 
international arbitration is based on the rationality of legal forms, but this 
rationality is not the result of well established procedures or the generalization of 
social consensus; it results from confidence in a strict control of legal techniques 
associated with moral pulchritude. 
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